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The purpose of this analysis is to provide a perspective on legal and economic 
dimensions of commercial gaming industries in the European Union—with specific 
emphasis on the casino industries in Europe—in comparison to similar industries in 
other parts of the world. This is intended to provide a platform for extrapolating from 
current developments in the European Union to find implications of current trends and 
events, based on the experiences of other jurisdictions.  
The first portion of the analysis examines observations that were put forward by 
the author and others in the report, “Study of Gambling Services in the Internal Market 
of the European Union.”
1 That study addressed the legal and economic challenges 
confronting the commercial gaming industries within the European Union in the early 
21
st century. The essence of the study is as follows. 
The European Union’s fundamental legal and economic principles relating to 
commerce are based upon the concepts of free and fair trade for goods and services 
                                                 
1 Study conducted by the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, Lausanne, on behalf of the European 
Commission, June 2006. The author, along with Professor Richard Thalheimer of the University of 
Louisville, co-authored the economics portion of the Gambling Services Study. 
  1among legal entities within the Member States and, more specifically, on the freedom of 
establishment within the European Union, and the freedom to provide services. Within 
the European Union, the freedom to provide services can be limited on the grounds of 
public policy, security and health, as contained in Article 46 of the EC Treaty.   
Restrictions to provide services on public policy, security and health grounds must have 
an “objective justification,” and part of the assessment of whether a restriction can be 
objectively justified is a consideration of whether the restrictive measure is 
proportionate.
2
European Union law also says, in general, that Member States are not permitted 
to discriminate against individuals or organizations from other Member States with 
respect to the delivery of services within the Union. This principle is known as non-
discrimination.  Exceptions to the freedom to provide services and non-discrimination 
can occur around so-called morality industries, such as alcohol, tobacco, and gambling.  
For these economic sectors (and others,) Member States retain the right (the 
competence) to regulate the sector as long as they adhere to the fundamental freedoms 
and general principles of EC law, including the free movement of services. Indeed, as 
with the United States, unless a competence is explicitly given to the EC, then it resides 
with the Member State.  With the so-called morality industries, the question of where 
the boundaries of the competences lie is still being debated via European Court of 
Justice case law and European Commission infringement proceedings.  When deciding 
whether or not European Community institutions should have (some degree of) 
competences to regulate a specific sector, it would have to be shown that action within 
the Member States is insufficient and that the objectives (e.g. consumer protection for 
legal gambling environments) can only be properly upheld with the Community 
enjoying some competence to regulate. 
With regards to the regulation of most aspects of the morality industries – 
alcohol, tobacco, gambling – Member States enjoy a considerable margin of discretion 
to maintain specific policies, which may include justifiable restrictions on the free 
movement of services. These restrictions form part of wider policies which reflect the 
desires of national policy makers to protect their citizens from the unintended negative 
social consequences associated with such industries. These policy objectives are often 
executed through the use of state monopolies and other constraints on offering such 
services. However, such restrictions, and ultimately the monopolistic models they 
support, can only be justified if they are proportionate.  In this context, evaluation of the 




2. Legal and Economic Circumstances of the Gambling Services Sector in the European 
Union 
 
The following general observations characterize the gaming and betting industries in 
2006 in the European Union. A high proportion of gaming industries within the 
European Union are characterized by monopoly protection. These monopolies are 
formally justified by particular Member States on the basis that such market constraints 
provide protection for their citizens from adverse consequences associated with 
gambling. However, the protections also allow significant capture of economic rents by 
                                                 
2 Proportionate, as it applies to restrictions against the provision of services, means that approaches that 
are adopted are the most efficient means of achieving the stated objectives, and the benefits that are 
achieved out-weigh the costs imposed by violations of fundamental European Union principles. 
  2Member States; such economic rents are important contributors to general fund 
revenues, or are earmarked by Member States for a variety of good causes. The 
magnitudes of economic rents arising from protected commercial gaming industries in 
the Member States are dramatic, in excess of €30 billion.
3 This is why challenges 
arising from private sector organizations within the European Union who are foreclosed 
from competing in these markets have made this such a controversial political and legal 
issue. 
For the most part, the gaming and betting industries within the European Union 
have become mature markets with slow growth or even stagnation in terms of revenue 
performance. In some respects, the performance of commercial gaming industries in the 
European Union reflects inefficiencies that are generally associated with monopoly or 
with organizations that are not confronted with the disciplines of competition. 
Monopoly, by its very nature, is characterized by constraints on supply, by higher prices 
than would occur in more competitive circumstances, and by limited choices 
confronting consumers. Furthermore, monopoly can lead to questionable quality of 
products offered in the marketplace, in comparison to what might prevail in a 
competitive environment. Furthermore, when there is either state ownership or 
significant state influence over operations, operators may not be clear with respect to 
what they are supposed to be doing. If a firm is in a highly competitive private sector 
ownership environment, maximizing shareholder wealth via pursuit of profitability of 
gaming operations is a much clearer objective than when there a protected market 
position for an organization that is subject to public scrutiny and political pressures.  
However, as has characterized much of the litigation that has challenged the 
European Union’s gaming and betting industries in recent years, state monopolies in 
gaming and betting—as well as limited or exclusive franchises that are protected by 
Member State law—are threatened by cross-border competition, especially from the 
Internet and the betting sectors. Much of the litigation that has occurred in recent years 
has come about because of expansions and new technologies in these sectors, as well as 
the perceived or real threats that such competitors pose for the existing monopolies and 
protected sectors. Protected markets can be easily threatened by properly incentivized 
competitors. 
The European Court of Justice has produced a number of important decisions 
since 1994 addressing the restrictions which Member States may uphold against the free 
movement of gambling services.
4  Non-discriminatory restrictions to the free movement 
of services can be justified by public policy objectives, including protecting consumers 
against the negative individual and social consequences of gambling. Such restrictions 
have to be proportionate to their objectives.  
                                                 
3 Study of Gambling Services in the Internal Market of the European Union (2006), a study commissioned 
and owned by the European Commission, pp. 1485-1487. The entire report can be found and 
electronically downloaded for free at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/gambling_en.htm. 
4 The most important European Court of Justice decisions in recent years include Gambelli (November 
11, 2003), Lindman (November 13, 2003), Laara (September 21, 1999), Zenatti (November 6, 2003) and 
Schindler (March 24, 1994). A similar case that was announced in March 2007 is the Placanica case. 
  3Based on the principle of subsidiarity
5, Member States are not in violation of the 
European Community Treaty as long as restrictions on the provision of gaming services 
can be justified by the objectives of social policy and consumer protection aimed at 
limiting the harmful effects associated with gambling activities, the restrictions are not 
discriminatory, and they are proportionate to these objectives. Thus, the rulings of the 
European Court of Justice suggest the need to weigh the trade-offs between violation of 
fundamental European Union principles versus the benefits that may accrue by allowing 
Member States to provide such protections.  
Interestingly the raising of money for good causes or for general fund revenues 
of Member States cannot be used as a justification for restrictive policy. This is one of 
the basic dilemmas associated with European Union policy toward commercial gaming. 
Every Member State is dependent to some extent on the economic rents captured 
through permitting monopolies—in one form or another—on gambling services. 
However, Member States cannot have such fiscal benefits as the primary or even a 
contributing factor for the legal justification. Thus, Member States are put into the 
position of having to offer hypocritical and sometimes disingenuous claims to the effect 
that the primary purpose of market-restricted gaming and betting markets is to protect 
their own consumers, rather than generate revenues on behalf of the State.  
The European Court of Justice has also stated that Member State gambling 
restrictions are only acceptable if they reflect an honest attempt to bring about a genuine 
diminution of gambling opportunities.
6 This creates conflicting objectives with regard 
to various Member States because the protected organizations typically are charged by 
their own governments with improving contributions to tax coffers or good causes. 
Furthermore, gaming and betting organizations typically want to improve their financial 
performance as organizations, and such inclinations are not necessarily consistent with 
actions that would “genuinely diminish” the gambling opportunities to their citizens at 
large.  
The Study of Gambling Services in the Internal Market of the European Union 
(The Gambling Services Study) examined the status of European Union gaming and 
betting revenue performance by sector, which provided rough estimates of the size and 
competitive characteristics of the European Union commercial gaming industries. Table 
1 presents estimates of aggregate Gross Gaming Revenues (defined as total revenues 
less payment of prizes) for the year 2003, covering the five measurable gaming sectors: 
casinos, lottery, gaming machines, betting services, and bingo services. For the 
European Union Member States in total, aggregate Gross Gaming Revenues were about 
52 billion Euros.
7 A separate survey of remote gaming for internet gambling estimated 
gross gaming revenues of approximately 2.5 billion Euros for that sector in 2004.  
                                                 
5 The principle of subsidiarity is found within Article 5 of the EC Treaty, which reads:  
 The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the 
objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, 
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.  Any action 
by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty. 
 
6 European Court of Justice, Zenatti (November 3, 2003, para. 36) 
7 This includes those Member States that did not become members of the European Union until 2004. 
These Member States are Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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COUNTRY        
         
AUSTRIA  € 893,539  € 217,951  € 595,000  € 0  € 80,588  n/a 
BELGIUM  € 679,306  € 47,478  € 485,734  € 136,767  € 9,327  € 0 
CYPRUS  € 72,584  € 0  € 34,060  € 0  € 38,523  n/a 
CZECH REPUBLIC*  € 593,400  € 66,300  € 109,200  € 346,700  € 34,300  € 1,900 
DENMARK  € 829,549  € 43,624  € 428,859  € 220,824  € 95,973  € 40,268 
ESTONIA  € 24,730  € 18,187  € 6,544  n/a  n/a  n/a 
FINLAND  € 1,240,874  € 22,000  € 485,000  € 571,000  € 157,000  € 5,874 
FRANCE  € 7,603,200  € 2,546,000  € 3,085,200  € 0  € 1,972,000  n/a 
GERMANY  € 8,420,817  € 958,673  € 4,991,217  € 2,335,000  € 135,927  n/a 
GREECE  € 1,068,203  € 88,721  € 474,000  € 0  € 505,482  € 0 
HUNGARY  € 580,180  € 36,957  € 278,240  € 235,851  € 23,529  € 5,603 
IRELAND  € 1,143,638  € 0  € 264,900  € 242,692  € 608,914  € 27,132 
ITALY  € 6,204,712  € 616,744  € 4,502,000  € 0  € 974,981  € 110,987 
LATVIA  € 66,611  € 7,114  € 4,159  € 52,831  € 1,155  € 1,352 
LITHUANIA  € 40,724  € 13,517  € 24,688  € 492  € 2,028  n/a 
LUXEMBOURG  € 96,584  € 77,907  €  18,676  n/a n/a n/a 
MALTA  € 113,921  € 23,269  € 23,884  € 0  € 65,923  € 845 
NETHERLANDS  € 2,064,500  € 699,400  € 783,200  € 564,000  € 17,900  n/a 
POLAND  € 432,408  € 44,535  € 295,393  € 52,703  € 37,691  € 2,085 
PORTUGAL  € 1,434,379  € 301,006  € 801,976  € 200,666  € 10,647  € 120,084 
SLOVAKIA  € 216,150  € 95,479  € 71,000  € 49,644  € 27  n/a 
SLOVENIA  € 264,478  € 193,227  € 38,192  € 33,059  n/a  n/a 
SPAIN  € 4,886,812  € 320,912  € 1,126,400  € 2,550,000  € 62,259  € 827,241 
SWEDEN  € 1,583,200  € 124,900  € 664,200  € 224,100  € 506,700  € 63,300 
UNITED KINGDOM  € 10,972,019  € 950,007  € 3,389,000  € 1,858,834  € 3,525,962  € 1,248,216 
      
        
 
TOTALS*  € 51,526,518  € 7,513,908  € 22,980,723  € 9,675,162  € 8,866,836  € 2,454,887 
        
PERCENT  OF  TOTAL  100.0%  14.6% 44.6% 18.8% 17.2% 4.8% 
 
What is noteworthy is the composition of gaming revenues within the European Union. 
Lotteries take the largest share with nearly half (44.6%) of gross gaming revenue. 
Casinos provide a relatively unimportant 14.6% (in comparison to the experience of 
jurisdictions in other parts of the world.) Gaming machines (outside of casinos) 
generated 18.8% of total gaming revenues, much larger than their share in the United 
States. Betting services made up 17.2% of the total, and bingos contributed a small 
sliver of the overall pie, with 4.8% of the total.  
                                                 
8 Gambling Services Study (2006), op. cit., p. 1106; shaded entries came from Gaming and Betting 
Global Consultants (2005), Double or Quits? - Global Gaming Review 2004-2005. London. 
 
 
  5The  Gambling Services Study also made comparisons on the ratio of Gross 
Gaming Revenues to GDP within the European Union among the various Member 
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Gross Gaming Revenues as 
percentage of GDP, 2003
 
The variances from Member State to Member State are probably due to differences in 
the attractiveness and availability of various gaming products, especially gaming 
machines and casino style gaming. Malta, which is the striking exception, generates a 
high proportion of its gaming revenues from export-based internet gaming services. 
It is also worthwhile to note differences in composition of spending between the 
European Union and the United States. Table 2 provides a breakdown for Gross Gaming 
Revenues by category for the United States. 
  
Table 2 
Gross Gaming Revenues by Sector 
United States, 2004 
  U.S.$ (billions)  Market Share 
Casinos (Commercial and 
Tribal) 
$50.0 63.5% 
Lottery (including VLTs)  $21.4  27.2% 
Pari-mutuel wagering  $3.7  4.7% 
Bingo and Charities  $3.6  4.6% 
 
Overall, the ratio of Gross Gaming Revenues as a proportion of GDP for the 
European Union (0.52%) is not significantly different from the United States (0.65%), 
though the composition is dramatically different. In 2004, the legal commercial gaming 
industries in the United States generated approximately US$ 80 billion in Gross Gaming 
Revenues, of which roughly two-thirds came from either commercial or tribal casinos. 
Commercial casinos are to be found in the eleven United States, including Nevada, that 
  6permit such casinos, which generated about US$30 billion in Gross Gaming Revenues 
in 2004.  Tribal casinos, which are permitted in about 25 states in the United States, 
generated around US$ 20 billion in Gross Gaming Revenues.  
The differences between the United States and the European Union in 
composition of Gross Gaming Revenues spending are quite dramatic. Casinos within 
the United States capture most spending on gambling, whereas in the European Union 
casinos provide a relatively small portion of total gaming spend. Among the important 
institutional differences is the fact that, in the United States, gaming machines outside 
of casinos are uncommon, whereas in Europe they are well established. Furthermore, 
American casinos are often much larger and more multi-dimensional in terms of non-
gaming offerings than are those found in Europe.  
A second differential factor is betting shops—legal betting facilities which 
permit wagers on races or sporting events. These are generally prohibited in the United 
States with only a few exceptions, but they are quite common in Europe.  
Though both the United States and the European Union spend slightly more than 
one-half of one percent on gambling and betting services, a number of other countries— 
Canada, New Zealand, and Australia— are all above 1% on the Gross Gaming 
Revenues/GDP ratio, with Australia approaching 2%. (Table 3) These countries also 
happen to have considerably more accessible forms of popular gaming, especially 
electronic gaming devices or gaming machines. Perhaps related to this higher ratio, all 
three of these countries have experienced substantial political backlash in the past 
decade related to gambling’s social costs issues especially around problem gambling 
than has been the case in either the European Union or the United States. 
 
Table 3 


















3. Justifications for Subsidiarity: Protections of European Union Citizens 
 
The primary question regarding the justification of national restrictions against 
the cross-border provision of gambling is: Are Member States really providing adequate 
protections for their citizens against the negative consequences associated with 
gambling? In the same vein, what is the relationship of particular protections to results 
of policies created by Member States? So far, Member States have claimed that the 
underlying purpose or philosophy for their justifications for monopolizing or 
constraining specific sectors of their gaming industries are the protections offered for 
consumers. However, there is virtually no scientifically based evidence that 
demonstrates the protections provided are actually working. This phenomenon—an 
  7absence of proof of the efficacy of protection-based strategies—is occurring throughout 
the world, though in different policy contexts.  
There is only limited understanding and research that establishes cause-effect 
relationships linking problem and pathological gambling to the availability and access 
of permitted gambling services. There is even less understanding of the extent to which 
strategies are effective in terms of mitigating adverse consequences associated with 
problem gambling in a commercial gaming environment. Thus, jurisdictions throughout 
the world are typically approaching this issue without hard evidence but rather on hopes 
and beliefs. Often the attitude that “something must be done” leads to “symbolic” 
actions that are undertaken even when there is only low expectations that they might be 
even partially effective. So everybody is shooting in the dark. However, for the 
European Union, the issues of subsidiarity and proportionality are very important to the 
Member States for fiscal reasons as well, to the extent that preservations of monopoly 
protections are necessary to insulate the current flow of economic rents captured by the 
Member States from erosion by competition.   
Could these protections be provided just as well or better under different 
ownership or market structure regimes? It has been argued that the existing gaming and 
betting industries in the European Union are justified in providing services even though 
they might violate fundamental EU principles via monopoly or market protections, or 
government ownership, because such structures are necessary to provide consumer 
protections. However, there is no evidence that demonstrate whether the protections 
provided actually work or not. Nor is there evidence that if market structures were 
modified towards more competitive markets or more private sector ownership whether 
situations would be much worse—or much different—with regard to protections than 
the status quo. These are the fundamental scientific questions on which the law may 
ultimately have to be determined.  
The principle of proportionality can also be brought to bear on this question. 
There are indeed certain social and private costs that accrue to various economic 
actors—in terms of loss of efficiency, reductions in consumer convenience, and losses 
of consumer surplus—because of monopoly constraints or state ownership with respect 
to a consumer service activity. These must be weighed against the purported benefits 
coming from such protections. This is where the real challenge for future social 
scientists will lie in addressing this issue.  
One implication of the relevant European Court of Justice decisions is that Member 
States must implement effective and verifiable mitigation programs or put at risk the 
substantial economic rents that come from their gambling sectors. In terms of the 
magnitudes of risk, the Gambling Services Study estimated that economic rents accruing 
either to member states, general fund revenues, or to good causes are somewhere in the 
vicinity of €37.6 billion, or about 73% of Gross Gaming Revenues in 2003.
9 These are 
significant amounts whose future will remain in doubt until the legal issues surrounding 
restrictions against the cross-border supply of gambling services are resolved. Of 
course, there are interested parties trying to persuade the European Court of Justice and 
the European Commission one way or the other in this very interesting debate.  
The Gambling Services Study tried to provide insights for future developments 
within the European Union without passing judgment on how the legal arguments might 
ultimately be resolved.  Models were developed to project forward what might happen 
to Gross Gaming Revenues and to economic rents to the year 2010, broken down by 
Member State and by gaming sector under three scenarios.
10  
                                                 
9 Gambling Services Study, op. cit., p. 1404 
10 This entire analysis can be found at Ibid., pp. 1399-1430 
  8The first model scenario—referred to as the “preservation of the status quo”—
basically assumes that the current legal environment would remain relatively unchanged 
for the next five years; and patterns of growth of the various sectors of the commercial 
gaming and betting industries within the Member States would reflect their current 
economic and legal realities. Because, for the most part, Member State gaming markets 
are relatively mature, they would grow in proportion to aggregate personal income in 
the respective Member States. Under this scenario, Gross Gaming Revenues would 
increase to about €60 billion and economic rents to about €44 billion by 2010. The 
economic rents captured by Memer States reflect tax revenues and “taxes-in-kind” that 
would be collected as a by-product of the profits that emerge from the constrained 
markets of the gaming and betting industries.  
The first alternative scenario—the “moderate change” scenario—assumes that 
legal findings would find in favor of those who have argued that market protections 
cannot be legally justified on proportionality grounds, i.e. the protections that come 
from state monopolies could just as efficiently be delivered with private sector 
ownership alternatives.  However, the protective measures that affect consumers—such 
as limitations on advertising, hours of operation, games to be offered, prohibitions on 
credit, etc.—would be preserved. The moderate change scenario would open the door to 
additional competitors who could then bid on limited license opportunities for casinos, 
lotteries, or whatever opportunities may be available. In this case, the model suggests 
that growth in Gross Gaming Revenues would be about the same as the status quo 
scenario, but there would be some erosion in economic rents brought about by a more 
competitive environment. 
The second alternative scenario—the “dramatic change” scenario—assumes that 
the courts would find that justifications for restrictive measures would largely be thrown 
out and the European Union’s commercial gaming industries would be open to much 
more substantial competitive pressures in the forms of cross-border competition, greater 
numbers of providers of gambling services, and better access to gambling services for 
consumers throughout the European Union generally. In this case, there would be more 
substantial growth in Gross Gaming Revenues, as a by-product of increased 
competition. To some extent, revenue growth would be neutralized by downward 
pressure on prices that, ceteris paribus, would lower revenues as markets moved away 
from monopoly pricing towards more competitive pricing. However, based upon 
elasticity studies from the literature that were used as a foundation for the modeling, it 
was estimated that Gross Gaming Revenues would grow moderately over the next five 
years; however, there would be significant erosion in economic rents. The model only 
looked forward about five years. Longer term implications might be even more dramatic 
if, indeed, harmonization were to come to the commercial gaming industries.  
 
 
4. A Case Study: the Casino Industry in the European Union 
 
The balance of this analysis addresses the casino sector in the European Union and 
discusses the implications of greater competition for this particular sector as part of the 
broader question: “What would happen in the European Union if the legal rules that 
govern competitive conditions change?” This could occur as a result of either European 
Court of Justice decisions, the development of secondary Community legislation, or 
because of competitive pressures coming from either Member States or nearby countries 
that would subject the European casino industries to competition similar to 
developments elsewhere in the world. This section examines the implications of such a 
  9direction, how such a transformation might take place, and what Europeans might 
anticipate based upon the experiences elsewhere.  
The casino industries of Europe are presently noteworthy because of a number 
of characteristics. When casinos were legalized and authorized by the various Member 
States over the past century, it was common for countries to mimic the laws and 
practices of casino industries in nearby or adjacent countries. For example, the French 
casino industry—whose enabling legislation was passed in 1907—was influential in 
shaping the Spanish casino industry in terms of labor practices, ambiance, size, and 
even tax revenue structures. Most casinos throughout the European Union follow the 
legal pattern of limited or exclusive licenses that form the basis for regional monopoly 
casinos. Rarely in the European Union is there anything that approaches competition in 
the American context – as one would find in casino industries in Nevada, Atlantic City 
or Mississippi.  
In comparison to many other parts of the world, casino industries in the 
European Union have seen relatively little change in legislative status over the past 
three decades. Legal casinos in Germany, Austria, and Italy pre-date World War II. 
The  Netherlands legalized casinos in the early 1970s; and Spain and Luxembourg 
authorized their casinos in 1977. Switzerland had very limited casinos throughout the 
20
th century, but passed their current law in 1992. However, they did not implement the 
new law until after 1999. Sweden enacted its legislation in 1999, and opened four state-
operated casinos (through the lottery Svenska Spel) over the next few years. Belgium 
legalized casinos in 1999 even though there had been “illegal” casinos openly operating 
and paying taxes without enabling legislation for some time. Between 1999 and 2005, 
the United Kingdom went through a very thorough but in some respects unsuccessful 
effort to reform their casino gaming laws with the Gaming Act 2005.
11 The prior 
legislation was the Gaming Act 1968.  
Tax rates for casinos in the European Union are comparatively high by world 
standards. Furthermore, labor unions exercise considerable influence in many European 
Union casinos relative to other jurisdictions. Ownership of casinos throughout the 
European Union can be either private sector or government ownership; however, 
government is always the major revenue sharer through direct ownership or high tax 
rates. 
There is considerable resistance to change and strong political sentiment for 
protectionism, especially among some of the original Member States of the European 
Union, such as France, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany. More competitive 
dynamics, for the casino sector at least, can be seen in the newer Member States of the 
European Union, especially Eastern European countries.  
Some of the important distinctions that can be made when comparing European 
Union casino industries to casino industries globally can be based on traditional 
economic typologies. Table 4 summarizes a number of these distinctions. Those 




                                                 
11 The original intent of the Gaming Act 2005 was to allow a number of “regional casinos” that would 
both meet the demand of British consumers and serve to regenerate city centers throughout the country, 
linked to the nine regional planning jurisdictions in the country.  However, because of political 
manipulations prior to the 2005 elections, the Act was amended such that the number of permitted 
regional casinos was reduced initially to eight, and then later to one.  Furthermore, the government’s 
recommended siting for that one regional casino was rejected by the House of Lords in spring 2007. 
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Typologies for Casino Industries 




Private Government  Hybrid 
Tax rates  Low Medium  High 
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of operation, 




























Ownership structures in the United States are typically private sector in orientation with 
the exception of American Indian tribal casinos, which are government owned. Casinos 
in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Macau, and most of South America are 
privately owned, as are casinos in UK, Estonia, Spain, France, Portugal and Greece. 
Government ownership of casinos is the norm in the Philippines, in Quebec and 
Manitoba in Canada, as well as Austria, the Netherlands, Finland, Slovenia, and 
Sweden. There are also various hybrid ownership structures where government owns a 
portion of the assets or operations of casino operations, and private sector interests own 
the balance of assets. This is the case in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and Nova 
Scotia, as well as in Switzerland and Italy.  
There is tremendous variation in tax rates for casinos from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction around the world. Tax rates on gross gaming revenues for casinos range 
from a 6.75% rate in Nevada and 8% in Atlantic City to rates that climb as high as 80% 
to 92% in parts of Europe. As a general rule, the tax rates imposed on casinos in the 
European Union are substantially above those in most other casino jurisdictions in the 
world. (Table 5.)  
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Table 5 
Maximum Percentage Tax Rates 
On European Union Casino Gross Gaming Revenues 
 
MEMBER STATE  MAXIMUM INCREMENTAL 
PERCENTAGE TAX RATE (2004) 
AUSTRIA  80% for tables; 48% for EGMs* 
BELGIUM  44% for tables; 50% for EGMs* 
CYPRUS N/A 
CZECH REPUBLIC  31% for tables; 20% for EGMs* 
DENMARK 75% 
ESTONIA 60% 








LITHUANIA  Unit tax on tables and machines 














With respect to market structures, monopolistically competitive and oligopolistic casino 
industries can be found in the American jurisdictions of Nevada, Atlantic City, and 
Mississippi, but almost nowhere else. Such markets have evolved toward oligopoly 
largely as a result of economies of scale and scope inherent in the casino/hotel resort 
  12industry.
12 Monopoly markets—created typically by legislative constraints and 
exclusive casino franchises— are not uncommon in Europe and, for that matter, in 
many other parts of the world as well.  
There are a wide variety of regulatory constraints that casino industries have to 
abide by. Casino size— constraints on how large casinos can be—is one that has greater 
importance in Europe than in many other parts of the world. This is often a zoning and 
planning issue at the municipal level, though high tax rates have the effect of 
discouraging the levels of capital investment that characterize modern “mega-casino” 
complexes. European casinos are substantially smaller than modern casinos found in 
many other countries, including the United States, Australia, Macau, and South Africa.  
Limits on the size of wagers that can be made within casinos, prohibitions 
against credit, limited hours of operation, specifications on which games or devices can 
be offered, mandated responsible gambling programs, and challenges to the legitimacy 
of private profit from casino operations, also appear as regulatory constraints on casino 
operations. Various Member States declare as a matter of policy that private profit is not 
a justifiable outcome of casinos. In such cases, profit has to be redirected to state coffers 
or “good causes,” at least partly because of the moral taint associated with gambling as 
an activity.  
Casino industries are also affected by external competition. This may take the 
form of cross border competition emanating from another Member State, another 
province, or another country, where casinos are competing for the same customer base. 
Convenience gaming—gaming machines located outside of casinos—may absorb a 
significant portion of demand for gambling if there is a substantial gaming machine 
industry. This is the case in many European Union countries, including the UK, Spain, 
Germany, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands, as well as Australia, New Zealand, 
and Canada; gaming machines are largely prohibited in France, Austria, Italy, and the 
United States. Internet gaming is another growing and emerging external competitive 
factor that will likely affect the casino industry in varying degrees in different parts of 
the world, but it still has many of its own legal and legitimacy challenges in various 
countries.  
The growth potential of casino markets is often linked to potential returns on 
invested capital, as well as legal rights to expand. In many European Union 
jurisdictions, it is virtually impossible for casinos to grow beyond their current 
dimensions without new legislation because of political and legal constraints either at 
the national or local level.   
Nonetheless, casino law has seen substantial liberalization in many parts of the 
world over the past two decades, and there is reason to believe the same considerations 
will soon—or eventually—come to the European Union. Typical objectives when 
enacting or liberalizing casino law can be found in one of three arguments. 
Liberalization of casino laws is often undertaken for fiscal benefits—to generate tax 
revenues either for the general fund or for earmarked purposes. Alternatively, casinos 
might be justified on the economic benefits they create; casinos can be strong catalysts 
to reverse the decline of particular regions, cities or areas within cities, for example. The 
third justification lies in the creation of consumer benefits; casinos are sometimes 
authorized because a jurisdiction’s citizens want to participate in casino gaming, and 
there is consensus that people have the right to make their own choices over such 
activities.  
                                                 
12 See, for example, William R. Eadington, “The economics of casino gambling,” in Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol 13, no. 3, August, 1999, pp. 173-192. 
 
  13However, it is not unusual for governments to be unclear in stating their explicit 
objectives for legalization or liberalization. A good example of this is found with the 
United Kingdom’s legislative efforts between 1999 to 2005, which led to passage of the 
Gaming Act 2005. The process was initiated by the Home Office with formation the 
Budd Commission in 2000, whose final report argued that the primary purpose in 
reforming the law was consumer benefit.
13 However, after government and 
parliamentary review, this objective eventually evolved into regeneration of needy areas 
as the primary purpose of reforming the law. Finally, at least with respect to casinos, the 
lack of clear objectives, along with an aggressive and cynical media campaign, resulted 
in passage of an inconsistent and generally unsatisfactory piece of legislation, at least 
with respect to casinos.  
What the British experience points out, and what the experience of many other 
jurisdictions has also demonstrated, is that it is politically difficult to justify consumer 
benefit as the primary reason for legalization or liberalization. The gaming industry 
remains a second class industry in the eyes of many, and casinos are symbolic of 
gaming in general. However, of the other two motivations for legalization or 
liberalization of casino laws, economic development potential is arguably considerably 
greater than fiscal contribution potential. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the 
experiences of casino developments and related investments in the cities of Melbourne, 
Australia and Cape Town, South Africa. In both cases, the economic rents created by 
casino legalization, and their ability to either concentrate economic activity around the 
casino or to fund other capital investments as part of the competitive bid process, 
resulted in spin-offs that generated significant economic benefits for the respective 
cities.  
 
5. The Essential Policy Question, and the Future of Gaming in the European Union 
 
The fundamental hypothesis suggested by this analysis with regard to the European 
Union is: “Does the current restrictive structure that prevails for casinos and other 
commercial gaming and betting industries throughout the European Union really 
provide protections that are not realized in other countries?” The European Union has 
monopolies and protected markets not only for casinos but for all other forms of 
commercial gaming, but do they really do a better job in protecting consumers than is 
the case in America, Australia, Canada, South Africa, or other jurisdictions that have 
different market structures? That is a question of science. Furthermore, what science 
reveals may undermine the reasoning behind national restrictions to the cross-border 
supply of gambling services within the European Union.  
A related question is: “Will Europeans embrace the kind of casino gaming that 
characterizes much of the rest of the world?” In other words, if some Member State 
laws were modified to permit American-style destination multifaceted casino resorts, 
would Europeans find them attractive? Many in Europe would claim: “No, we are 
different,” but the counter-question is: “Are Europeans different in terms of their tastes 
and preferences—in fundamental human behaviors with respect to gambling—from 
what can be found in every other corner of the world?” It is likely that Europeans are 
not much different than people who have left Europe for other parts of the world, and 
who have embraced other models of gambling that are quite different than the current 
offerings within Europe. 
                                                 
13 Department of Culture, Media and Sport, The Gambling Review Report (The Budd Report) 2001; 
retrieved at 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/Reference_library/Publications/archive_2001/gamb_rev_report.htm  
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States embrace? Can European Union Member States move away from the high tax, 
market-constrained, and state-owned models that are now common in Europe? 
Furthermore, if some Member States move in non-traditional directions, will there be a 
domino effect once those Member States successfully introduce “international style” 
casinos resorts? This is a process that has been observed in many other parts of the 
world, but will it also occur in Europe? There is good reason to believe the ultimate 
answer is going to be yes.  
In light of this expectation, what can Europe learn from the dynamics of casino 
industries elsewhere? One can start by examining the evolution of the casino industry in 
Las Vegas. Las Vegas has served as the prime inspiration for the past two decades for 
other jurisdictions throughout the world for legalizing casinos or liberalizing gaming 
legislation, because of the objective economic accomplishments that Las Vegas has 
achieved. Las Vegas has had the fastest population growth rate of any city in America 
for the last 30 years, driven by expansions in the casino industry. Its population is 
approaching two million, making Las Vegas by far the largest city in Nevada. Las 
Vegas has more quality hotel rooms than New York, Tokyo, London, and Paris 
combined. Las Vegas is arguably the best convention city and entertainment city in the 
world. It has become one of the best shopping cities in America and it continues to grow 
and create jobs in the tourism and construction sectors because of the inherent 
popularity of the products and services that it offers. The kind of multi-billion 
investment that typifies the Las Vegas Strip has occurred mainly since 1989. The next 
decade will bring a new generation of growth in Las Vegas, with projects like MGM 
Mirage’s $7 billion Cite Center and the Boyd Group’s $5 billion Echelon Place, which 
will add residential components to the more traditional casino-entertainment-restaurant-
convention-hotel mix.  
The other remarkable jurisdiction with respect to casino growth is Macau. As 
recently as the 1990s, Macau, which at the time was still under the administrative 
jurisdiction of the Portuguese, had a casino industry that was unattractive, tired, and 
arguably corrupt. Triads—Chinese organized crime—were actively involved in gaming 
operations, and scandals and assassinations linked to turf wars were not uncommon.
14
One lesson from Macau relates to the consequences of monopoly. A single 
concessionaire had held the monopoly for gaming in Macau from 1962 to 2002; over 
that 40 year period, even though billions of dollars in profits were earned, almost 
nothing was put back into Macau’s casino industry. There was a perception on the part 
of the concessionaire that there was little justification to make capital improvements, 
perhaps linked to a belief that their customers enjoyed squalid, dirty, smoky, and 
crowded conditions in the casinos. However, following the handover from Portugal to 
China in 1999, the Special Administrative Region of Macau decided to reform and 
expand the casino industry through legislative change. The new law called for three 
licenses to be issued, which ultimately led to six total licenses, as each concessionaire 
was allowed to give out a sub-license. This created a far more competitive environment, 
in some respects mirroring Las Vegas.  
Subsequently, Macau has become a highly competitive and dynamic market. 
Between 1989 and 2006, Las Vegas saw about $30 billion in new casino or capital 
expansion projects along the Las Vegas Strip. Macau, will generate about $20 billion in 
capital projects between 2004 and 2010. Even though Macau has a very high tax rate of 
                                                 
14 See, for example, William R. Eadington and Ricardo Siu, “Between Law and Custom ⎯ Examining 
the Interaction between Legislative Change and the Evolution of Macao’s Casino Industry,” International 
Gambling Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1–28, April 2007 
  15nearly 40% (compared to Nevada’s 6.75%) as well as serious regulatory challenges,
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still offers high enough expected returns on capital investment to attract substantial 
investments in new casino resorts.  
Another noteworthy jurisdiction is Singapore. Singapore is a relatively 
conservative city-state with the reputation of being a highly socially controlled 
environment, as well as a somewhat dull destination for tourists. The government of 
Singapore in 2005 came to the conclusion that casinos might be a way to change the 
city-state’s basic image and therefore the interest that potential visitors might have in 
visiting Singapore. Casinos were envisioned as a catalyst to stimulate Singaporean 
tourism. Singapore passed a comprehensive and focused law in 2005 that, among other 
things, created two gaming licenses—to be awarded via competitive bidding—with low 
tax rates which made it very attractive for potential international investors. The tax 
rates—at between 5% and 15% of gaming revenues – are substantially lower than those 
in Macau. As the result of the bidding process, Singapore will receive over US$7 billion 
in foreign direct investment with respect to the two “integrated resort” casino properties. 
Based on the criteria delineated in the bidding process, Singapore will end up with two 
integrated resorts that will have significant convention, entertainment, and retail 
offerings, as well as iconic architecture. Furthermore, there will be substantial direct tax 
revenue accruing to Singapore as a result of the casinos, as well as the creation of about 
10,000 to 15,000 jobs and significant entertainment offerings.  
What if a jurisdiction has different objectives than those represented by Las 
Vegas, Macau or Singapore? In the absence of explicit objectives, less desirable 
outcomes might evolve. One alternative is what has developed in Japan. In Japan, there 
are in excess of 18,000 pachinko/pachisuro parlors located throughout the country. A 
typical pachinko/pachisuro parlor has about 300 electronic gaming devices in a retail 
outlet, half of them pachinko (a form of vertical pinball), and the other half electronic 
gaming devices.
16 Total gaming revenues generated by these parlors in 2004 were 
approximately US$30 billion which, on a per capita basis, exceeds what Americans 
spend annually on their entire mix of gambling products and services. In general, such 
gaming is considered an “unattractive” gaming product and is more likely to invite 
social and political backlash. This is probably not considered a desirable outcome. 
If Europe is going to end up with a reasonable mix of gaming and casino 
services, what might need to happen to bring it about is a change in fundamental law, as 
well as a lowering of tax rates and improvements in competitive conditions. However, 
many European Union countries remain committed to their protectionist policies for 
gambling and casinos, but either legal challenges or cross border competition could 
bring about changes that trigger a rationalized evolution.   
In summary, one challenge that the European Union and its policy makers need 
to seriously evaluate is the absence of focused casino and gaming policy consistent with 
legal developments in the European Union, along with the risk of a continuing spread of 
“convenience gambling” in the Member States. If this were to occur, the European 
Union could very well end up with “unattractive” gaming in the Japanese sense, in 
                                                 
15 The regulatory issues that remain significant in Macau include concerns over money laundering, loan 
sharking, and participation in gaming operations by Triads. In particular, these issues pose problems for 
American, Australian and European regulators as well as for gaming companies licensed in those 
jurisdictions.  
 
16 CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets, “Unfavorable Odds: Japanese Pachinko Pachislot,” February 6, 2007. 
  16contrast to “attractive” gaming in the context of the other jurisdictions discussed.
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Furthermore, the social impacts associated with such gambling might be more 
pronounced. Countries where gambling has become most controversial—such as 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada—demonstrate this particular point. Finally, if the 
objective is to use casinos for broader economic development purposes or as catalysts to 
change the general attractiveness or ambience of particular areas, then convenience 
gambling, Japanese-style, that is already evolving in many countries in Europe, would 
erode that potential and may end up creating relatively undesirable outcomes. 
                                                 
17 Pachinko and other forms of “convenience gambling” (gaming machines located in 
retail outlets, arcades, bars and taverns, or Spartan purpose-built facilities) might be 
considered “unattractive gambling” in the sense that they do not provide gaming in 
aesthetically pleasings setting, they often draw their customers from disadvantaged sub-
groups of society, they do not bring about visible economic benefits in the form of job 
creation or capital investment, and they seem to have a disproportionate impact on 
problem gambling in communities.  See, for example, Pachinko Nation by David Plotz, U.S.-
Japan Foundation Media Fellows Program, 2001-2002, (retrieved at 
http://www.japansociety.org/web_docs/plotz_pachinko.pdf )    
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